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“ANYTHING YOU SAY MAY BE USED  
AGAINST YOU”:  A PROPOSED SEMINAR ON  
THE LAWYER’S DUTY TO WARN OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY’S LIMITS IN TODAY’S  
POST-ENRON WORLD 
Paul F. Rothstein*
I.  THE PROBLEM 
Once upon a time, people speaking about legally sensitive matters with 
their own attorneys (or even with their corporate employers’ attorneys) 
could be relatively confident that their conversations would be protected by 
attorney-client privilege and the lawyer’s ethical obligation of silence.  
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University, specializing in evidence, torts, and other 
subjects concerning civil, criminal, and constitutional judicial process from the U.S. 
Supreme Court on down. His publications include the books Federal Testimonial Privileges 
(2d ed. 2008), Evidence:  Cases, Materials & Problems (3d ed. 2006),  Evidence in a 
Nutshell (5th ed. 2007), Federal Rules of Evidence (3d ed. 2007), and numerous legal 
articles.  He has taught legal ethics and authored briefs in (among others) the Supreme 
Court’s Upjohn and Daubert cases.  A former Oxford University Fulbright Scholar, Law 
Review Editor-in-Chief, and Washington, D.C., trial practitioner, he has been special 
counsel and consultant to the judiciary committees of both houses of Congress (helping draft 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Crime Victims Compensation Act and to 
revise the full Federal Criminal Code, substantive and sentencing); the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (helping draft the Uniform Crime Victims 
Reparations Act and revise the Uniform Rules of Evidence); the National Academy of 
Sciences (on both voiceprint evidence and legality of new airport security technology); the 
Federal Judicial Center (training federal judges and contributing to the center’s Scientific 
Evidence Manual); the National Judicial College (training state judges); the Rand 
Corporation, Carnegie Foundation, Brookings Institution, and American Enterprise Institute 
(on mass civil lawsuits, science in court, and Daubert); the U.S. Department of Justice 
(training Justice Department trial attorneys); and, principally on constitutional, judicial, or 
related law reform, the governments of, among others, Canada, the Philippines, and over a 
dozen nations emerging from the former Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, and others).  He has also advised/assisted several U.S. state governments, 
federal agencies (inter alia, training Federal Trade Commission trial attorneys), bar 
associations, and some of the nation’s most prominent law firms. He chaired the Association 
of American Law Schools Evidence Section and an American Bar Association committee 
monitoring developments under the Federal and Uniform Rules of Evidence, suggesting 
changes to the Rules, a number of which have been made.  His series of national conferences 
on the Federal Rules of Evidence, and his accompanying book, the first on the Rules, are 
credited with introducing the bench, bar, and much of academia to what they would be 
facing under the new Rules.  He is also noted for his appearances in the print, radio, 
television, and electronic media. 
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Even today, most people—including law students—are under that same 
impression.  Indeed, broad assumptions of confidentiality underlie the 
leading attorney-client privilege case studied in law school, Upjohn Co. v. 
United States, which proclaimed, 
[The attorney-client privilege’s] purpose is to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote 
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice.  The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy 
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the 
lawyer being fully informed . . . .  [W]e recognize[] the purpose of the 
privilege to be “to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their 
attorneys.”  
 . . . .  
 . . . [T]he privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional 
advice . . . but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him 
to give sound and informed advice.  The first step in the resolution of any 
legal problem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through 
the facts with an eye to the legally relevant. 
 . . . .  
 . . . [Failure to accord privilege as in] the court below thus frustrates 
the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of 
relevant information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to 
render legal advice to the client corporation. . . . 
 . . . [This] not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to 
formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal 
problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate 
counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the law.1
Thus Upjohn takes as a given that lawyer communications are by and 
large confidential, that people know this, and that people will be more 
willing to communicate with a lawyer because of it. 
The official comment to the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (“Confidentiality of Information”) expresses 
similar thoughts, parroting rubrics from its predecessor codes drafted earlier 
in the twentieth century: 
 A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that . . . the 
lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation. . . .  
 1. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–92 (1981) (citations omitted).  That 
corporate counsel do, at least sometimes, caution against illegality as Upjohn supposes, is 
illustrated by a recently reported incident involving Chiquita International Brands Co. See 
Carol D. Leonnig, Advice from Justice Dept. Central to Chiquita Case, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 
2007, at A1 (“[I]nternal Chiquita records state that the company’s outside legal counsel 
warned them in February 2003 that they ‘must stop [the] [illegal] payments [to a group the 
State Department had declared a terrorist group].’. . . ‘Bottom line:  CANNOT MAKE THE 
PAYMENT,’ the Kirkland & Ellis law firm advised Chiquita, according to court records and 
sources.”).  
  
2007] A PROPOSED SEMINAR ON CONFIDENTIALITY 1747 
 
This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer 
relationship.  The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and 
to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing 
or legally damaging subject matter.  The lawyer needs this information to 
represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to 
refrain from wrongful conduct.  Almost without exception, clients come 
to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of 
laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct.  Based upon 
experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, 
and the law is upheld.2
But these assumptions of confidentiality may be sadly mistaken today.  
Driven by a more jaundiced public perception of the role of lawyers than 
the rosy view expressed by Upjohn and the code commentary, modern law 
increasingly recognizes exceptions to legal privilege and the lawyer’s duty 
of silence.  More and more, lawyers are being permitted or expected to 
reveal information once thought to be confidential.  The trend has been 
fueled in part by the exposure in 2000 and 2001 of the calamitous series of 
corporate frauds collectively and popularly known as “Enron.”3  Lawyers 
and lawyer loyalty and secrecy were blamed for facilitating or hiding 
wrongdoing that inflicted billions of dollars of losses on investors, 
retirement funds, and the general economy.4
The public outcry produced a number of reforms.  The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act5 (SOX) was enacted in 2002, containing an array of anti-corporate-
fraud measures.6  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations 
 2. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2007). The Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct are recommended by the American Bar Association (ABA) for state 
adoption, to regulate lawyers licensed by the particular state, but a number of states have not 
adopted them, or have modified them, or have adopted some but not others.  The ABA 
Model Rules were promulgated in 1983 and extensively revised in 2002.  The Rules were 
further revised concerning a few provisions in 2003.  Some adopting states have also 
adopted the amendments, some have not, and some have adopted variants.  Where the ABA 
Model Rules are not adopted, usually some form of earlier ABA ethics code provisions, 
previously adopted by the state, remain in place, such as the 1969 ABA Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility (ABA Model Code)—which is different, despite its somewhat 
similar name, than the ABA Model Rules—or, less likely, the 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics.  
Confusingly, both the 1908 and 1969 codes use the word “Canon” for their general 
prescriptions.  I will generally cite herein only the ABA Model Rules on a particular matter, 
leaving to the students to cite the state provisions (as this essay is a proposal for a student 
research seminar, and should not give away the whole “ball game”). 
 3. See Paul F. Rothstein, The Story of Upjohn Co. v. United States:  One Man’s 
Journey to Extend Lawyer-Client Confidentiality, and the Social Forces that Affected It, in 
Evidence Stories 151, 153, 173 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006). 
 4. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper:  An Agenda for the SEC, 103 
Colum. L. Rev. 1293 (2003); Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud:  See, Lawyers, 26 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 195 (2003); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done:  The Bar’s 
Struggle with the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1236 (2003).
 5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
 6. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. IV 2004) (codifying a pertinent provision of Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) for our purposes).  In that provision, Congress told the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to establish “minimum standards of professional conduct for 
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adopted pursuant to SOX7 require public companies’ lawyers, who practice 
or appear before the SEC, to report to their superiors financial or fiduciary 
wrongdoing of their client or its agents if the wrongdoing meets a threshold 
of seriousness and comes to the lawyers’ attention in a sufficiently credible 
way.  If the superiors’ response is unsatisfactory, lawyers may report to the 
SEC.8  Corresponding or even broader provisions in many state and model 
ethics rules and rulings9—including the American Bar Association’s 
recommended Model Rules of Professional Conduct10 and the American 
Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers11—have 
heightened a lawyer’s license or duty to disclose wrongdoing even beyond 
the SEC context.12
Adding to the trend are new pressures on individuals and companies to 
waive privilege and expose previous lawyer confidences.  These pressures 
include government promises or policies of leniency for those who 
“cooperate” with investigations or who “self-report”—terms often 
interpreted to include waiving attorney-client privilege.13  The current 
escalation of penalties for corporate wrongdoing and the modern decline in 
company continuity and loyalty (as corporations change hands at ever-
increasing rates today) mean companies are likely to waive these and other 
protections that could have shielded predecessors and employees.14  While 
it has always been the case that an employee of a company who confided 
potentially self-damaging matters to company counsel risked disclosure if 
attorneys appearing and practicing before [the SEC],” and to require attorneys to report up 
the corporate ladder, to the company’s chief legal counsel or chief executive officer, 
evidence of material securities law violations or breaches of fiduciary duty, and if there is no 
“appropriate[]” response, to go further up the corporate ladder to the board of directors’ audit 
committee, which shall be composed solely of outside directors, or to the board of directors 
itself. Id. 
 7. The regulations appear at 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2006). See also Implementation of 
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6297, 6320 (Feb. 6, 2003) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205).  They became effective August 5, 2003, and in some respects 
arguably go beyond what Congress contemplated. See infra notes 8, 37. 
 8. Thus the regulations provide for two kinds of reporting of lawyer confidences:  “up-
the-ladder” (inside the client) and “outside-the-ladder” (outside the client). See infra note 37. 
 9. The local provisions are detailed in comparative chart format in Att’ys’ Liability 
Assurance Soc’y, Ethics Rules on Client Confidences, in Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. 
Rotunda, 2003 Selected Standards on Professional Responsibility, 161, 161–72 (2003).
 10. See generally Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct (2007). 
 11. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (2000). 
 12. I am not saying that all the exceptions to confidentiality that are discussed herein are 
recent or are the result of Enron, or even have been augmented recently.  They are germane 
to my central thesis regardless.  Rather, the exceptions have become more prominent 
because of recent developments.  The saga of how the ABA’s recommended ethics rules 
lagged behind many state provisions favoring disclosure of fraud, until the ABA’s hand was 
forced by Enron (and ensuing SEC developments) is told in Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal 
and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 Vill. L. Rev. 725, 727–34, 781 
(2004). 
 13. See generally Paul F. Rothstein & Susan W. Crump, Federal Testimonial Privileges 
§ 2:31 (2d ed. 2008); Rothstein, supra note 3, at 158–59, 175–76. 
 14. See Rothstein, supra note 3, at 175–77. 
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the company later decided to waive its privilege, these new corporate 
realities greatly enhance the chances of that happening. 
In addition, the courts are eroding expected confidentiality by, for 
example, expanding the sorts of conduct embraced by standard exceptions 
to privilege and ethical confidentiality such as the exceptions for crime and 
fraud,15 for lawyers defending themselves,16 and for business (nonlegal) 
communications.17
In light of these and other similar developments, the confidence that 
one’s communications with a lawyer will remain sacrosanct today may be 
badly misplaced.  This raises important questions concerning the duty of 
lawyers:  When, to what extent, and in what detail, does an attorney 
communicating with someone who may expect confidentiality, have a duty 
to explain in advance the circumstances under which the information gained 
may subsequently be revealed pursuant to these or other confidentiality 
loopholes?  Will the interviewee “clam up” in the face of such Miranda-like 
warnings?  If so, what does this do to the premise of Upjohn and the Model 
Rule comment that confidentiality enables attorneys to obtain the facts 
 15. A good statement of the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege is 
contained in Uniform Rule of Evidence 502(d)(1), which was recommended by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (who drafted it) and the ABA for state 
adoption and generally reflected the law in most states and federal courts.  There are 
decisions expanding this traditional exception in at least three ways:  (1) extending the 
exception beyond crime and fraud to include other wrongs and torts, (2) eroding threshold 
burdens of proof triggering in camera inspection and triggering the exception itself, and (3) 
blurring the distinction between, on the one hand, past wrongdoing (which is privileged) and, 
on the other hand, continuing, planned, or future wrongdoing (which is unprivileged), by 
articulating a theory of continuing duty to disclose past wrongdoing—making past 
wrongdoing that is not disclosed into present and continuing wrongdoing. See Rothstein, 
supra note 3, at 177–79; see also Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:36.  Ethics codes 
typically have confidentiality exceptions—somewhat analogous to the crime-fraud 
exception—that are also expanding. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(1)–
(3) (2007). 
 16. See, e.g., Unif. R. Evid. 502(d)(3) (unprivileging communications relevant to a 
breach of duty by either a client or lawyer to the other, such as in a malpractice action, fees 
lawsuit, claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal case, disciplinary proceeding, 
and other situations); Unif. R. Evid. 502(d)(4) (unprivileging communications needed to 
defend lawyer against charges he assisted the client in crime or fraud).  Ethics codes 
typically have somewhat similar confidentiality exceptions. See, e.g.,  Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 1.6(b)(4)–(5).  There is some difference among jurisdictions, both as to privilege 
and as to ethics provisions, regarding the extent to which the client must be involved in a 
matter or proceeding in which the lawyer is defending herself.  The importance of this 
exception for our purposes is magnified by the fact that there seems to be an increasing 
tendency to prosecute lawyers in connection with their client’s crimes, as noted in many 
statements and publications of members of the criminal and white-collar bar. See, e.g., Sheri 
Qualters, As Liability Grows, GCs Get Nervous; An SEC Fine of $40K Against a GC 
Illustrates Growing Scrutiny, Nat’l L.J., Sept. 26, 2006, at 8 (quoting Robert Ullman, a 
white-collar defense lawyer of the Boston firm Nutter McClennen & Fish, as saying that 
“[t]he government often overreaches when it brings criminal charges against lawyers and 
accountants who are trying to fix problems in their companies”). 
 17. See Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:8 (citing many cases and describing how 
under privilege, the purpose of the consultation must be for professional legal services). 
Ethics codes frequently have somewhat similar provisions. 
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necessary to advise properly against illegality?  These are significant 
questions and are the central focus of this essay.  But rather than directly 
answering, I propose a law school student seminar to explore them.  In the 
course thereof, I venture directions toward some tentative conclusions. 
II.  THE SEMINAR IN GENERAL 
Such a seminar is needed because these issues, which intimately affect 
what many of the students do in practice after graduation, usually are not 
covered elsewhere in the curriculum.  The seminar would also correct 
common student misimpressions about the ironclad nature of legal and 
ethical confidentiality. 
Seminar participants would prepare research papers and reports on the 
various current inroads on lawyer confidentiality, and would recommend 
and draft new ethical warnings found necessary and desirable.  Along the 
way, students would engage in simulated interviews in which the problem 
of potentially false expectations of confidentiality might arise, illustrating 
the problem and testing their tentative conclusions about the need for 
warnings. 
The seminar would meet in one two-hour session per week for fourteen 
weeks (the length of a typical semester).  Because a considerable amount of 
outside research and writing would be required of students in preparation 
for the sessions, the seminar should bear four hours of credit, even though it 
meets only two hours per week.  The class could accommodate between 
fifteen and twenty-five students. 
I will suggest below a general thrust, structure, and content for the 
seminar, but will leave considerable flexibility regarding details to those 
who might wish to adopt the proposal.18  My purpose is merely to provide a 
framework to be fleshed out by potential adopters.  I would appreciate any 
suggestions for further refinement readers may have. 
III.  SEMINAR GOALS 
A.  The End Product 
A series of preliminary research reports would be written and presented 
to the seminar by the students during the first eight weeks.  These reports 
will be described more fully later in this essay.  They would lay the 
groundwork for the end product of the seminar, which would consist of: 
(1) A Written Class Consensus on Whether and When Warnings 
Are Needed.  The consensus (or as close thereto as possible) 
would be reached in a summary discussion session several 
 18. For one mechanical example, I have not said much about how the reports and related 
tasks I describe are to be allocated among the students.  Whether and to what extent students 
would be assigned more than one will depend on, among other things, how many students 
are enrolled in the seminar. 
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sessions before the end of the seminar.  The consensus would 
be based on the series of research papers presented earlier in 
the seminar.  The consensus would be reduced to writing prior 
to the next session of the seminar, by a student assigned as a 
reporter.  Dissenting students could write their own dissents.  
The consensus should cover: 
(a) What confidentiality loopholes (if any) might require 
warnings to clients and others in advance of 
communications with lawyers? 
(b) What fact situations (if any) should trigger warnings? 
(c) What should the warnings say? 
(d) Are existing rules concerning warnings adequate?  If 
not, in what respects are they deficient? 
(2) Draft Warning Provisions.  A proposed model Miranda-style 
warnings rule (or rules) of legal ethics (with explanatory 
commentary) should be drafted by the entire group, subsequent 
to and embodying the consensus, if the consensus is that a 
rule(s) is needed and existing rules are deficient.  The new 
rule(s) would deal with the issues labeled (a) through (d) 
above, to the extent deemed desirable and feasible.  A tentative 
outline of a commentary for the new rule or rules would also be 
agreed upon at the same time.  A student would be assigned to 
write up the draft model rule(s) and commentary for the next 
session, in which session there would be a final rule-and-
commentary markup.  The final session of the seminar would 
be devoted to examining the final draft rule(s) and 
commentary.  If the consensus was that no new ethical 
prescription is needed, these last sessions should be devoted to 
preparing fall-back provisions in case a jurisdiction differed 
with that conclusion. 
In making assignments with respect to these end products, the teacher 
should take care to ensure that work is distributed equitably among the 
students, especially since there will have been earlier extensive student 
reports to the class on various background legal and ethical issues, as 
described elsewhere in this essay. 
B.  Educational Objectives 
The seminar would attempt to inculcate and afford practice in certain 
lawyering skills, as well as to enlighten regarding substantive principles of 
law and ethics.  More specifically, the teaching objectives would be to 
(1) disabuse students of the notion that ethics and privilege 
guarantee lawyer confidentiality; 
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(2) sensitize them to ethical obligations and the conflicting pulls 
that most ethical judgments involve; 
(3) give them practice in researching ethics materials; 
(4) introduce them to the skill of client and witness interviewing; 
(5) expose them to the kind of collaborative work effort that 
characterizes the best law firms; 
(6) impart some notion of what it is to draft a statutory or rule 
provision, and what kinds of things might be left to 
commentary or legislative history; and 
(7) perhaps produce contribution(s) to defining ethical conduct and 
to the literature in the field. 
The following sections of this essay contain some further thoughts about 
how the seminar might proceed, and matters that might be germane along 
the way. 
IV.  SEMINAR PHASE ONE:  BACKGROUND REPORTS 
The first phase of the seminar would embrace approximately the first 
four weeks of the semester.  It would be devoted to compiling reports on the 
legal and ethical prescriptions, principles, and exceptions that might be 
pertinent to the end products down the road.  During this phase, students 
would be assigned to prepare and present, orally and in writing to the group, 
papers on topics discussed in each of the following four lettered sections.19  
Some of the class session time in this phase could be given back to the 
students to work privately on their papers, with the teacher on call during 
released classroom time—and at other times as well—for individual 
consultations with those preparing the papers. 
 19. One or several students should be assigned to each of the topics, depending on the 
number of students in the seminar and how the teacher chooses to divide the work.  The 
teacher could decide whether research on all four of the topics should start simultaneously or 
whether each should wait until the previous one is completed and presented to the group.  
There is enough information in this essay to get research on all the topics started 
simultaneously without waiting for the others.  In any event, presentation to the seminar of 
the four topics should be seriatim.  The third and fourth topics could be delivered to the 
seminar out of order, and even before the other topics are in.  These variations in order are 
all possible because I am assuming the teacher will have given a relatively thorough 
introduction on the opening days of the seminar and that, at the weekly meetings of the full 
seminar, the teacher will go around the table and get oral reports of the progress and 
preliminary findings of each of the student researchers. 
Even if I were relatively “omniscient” about the subject, I would not try to provide 
exhaustively in the present essay everything the students will be expected to uncover in their 
research, since they will undoubtedly discover this essay and that would defeat the research 
skills we are striving to inculcate.  My guideline in this essay has been to provide only 
enough substantive legal and ethical information to indicate the general sorts of things that 
can be done and found and the direction the research should take—that is, enough to get the 
ball rolling. 
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A.  First Seminar Background Report(s):   
Possible Sources of Confidentiality 
Students assigned to this topic would prepare and present, orally and in 
writing, background briefing material that would describe the legal and 
ethical sources of confidentiality, citing authorities.  This briefing should 
include discussion of attorney-client privilege,20 tort decisions providing 
liability for breach of confidentiality,21 ethical code provisions inveighing 
confidentiality,22 ethical opinions and disciplinary rulings reinforcing 
confidentiality,23 and relevant criminal cases24—in other words, anything 
giving rise to or significantly contributing to a duty of confidentiality.25  
The differences in general scope among these various sources would also be 
presented and illustrated, such as the difference between the coverage of the 
ethical requirement of confidentiality and that of privilege.26
 20. See, e.g., Unif. R. Evid. 502; Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 
68–86 (2000). 
 21. See, e.g., Richard A. Zitrin et al., Legal Ethics in the Practice of Law 125 (3d ed. 
2007) (setting forth a sample tort complaint). 
 22. See, for example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.6(a), 1.8(b), 
1.9(c), 1.18(b) (2007) and the corresponding provisions of the 1983 Model Rules, the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(A) (1983), and the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers § 60 (2000). See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 15. 
 23. See, e.g., Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 1995); In re 
Mandelman, 514 N.W.2d 11 (Wis. 1994); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 93-370 (1993); State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 2000-
11 (2000); see also Kan. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics/Advisory Servs., Op. 01-01 (2001); 
N.D. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 95-11 (1995). 
 24. See, e.g., People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975), aff’d, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975). 
 25. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (noting that 
confidentiality is so important that it persists after the death of a client); Ag Gro Serv. Co. v. 
Sophia Land Co., 8 F. Supp. 2d 495, 498 (D. Md. 1997) (noting that confidentiality is not 
just a “fine point” of ethics, but central to the relationship of lawyer and client).  
Prescriptions commanding confidentiality to lawyers’ employees would be relevant here, as 
well. See Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility, Am. Bar Ass’n, Annotated Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct 94 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter Annotated Model Rules]. 
 26. See Ex parte Taylor Coal Co., 401 So. 2d 1, 7–8 (Ala. 1981).  Taylor Coal noted that 
a finding that client information is not within the privilege does not mean that a lawyer is 
permitted to reveal it. Id.  Unlike privilege, the ethical duty of confidentiality applies 
notwithstanding the facts that there has already been disclosure, that the source of 
information about the representation is not the client, that the information was not 
communicated in confidence, that the information is not sought or given in a formal 
proceeding, that the information about the representation was not derived from a client 
confidence, that the communication related to the client’s will, or that information is of the 
generalized kind mentioned later in this essay, which would not be privileged. See In re 
Goebel, 703 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind. 1998); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmts. 3, 4 
(2007); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 411 (1998); ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1287 (1974) (DR 4-101(A)); see 
also Taylor Coal, 401 So. 2d 1; In re Anonymous, 654 N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. 1995); Lawyer 
Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 1995); In re Harman, 628 N.W.2d 351 
(Wis. 2001); State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 2000-11 (2000); 
Miss. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 101 (1985); N.D. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., 
Op. 95-11 (1995); Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Op. 82-5F-25 
(1982).  But see Profit Mgmt. Dev. v. Jacobson, Brandvik, and Anderson, Ltd., 721 N.E.2d 
  
1754 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
 
B.  Second Seminar Background Report(s):  Limitations on Confidentiality 
Under the Various Sources 
This background paper (or series of papers) would compile and present a 
list with descriptions (supported by authorities) of all principles limiting 
confidentiality under each of the above sources.27  The descriptions would 
be of the fact situations in which each confidentiality limit applies, using 
hypothetical or real case illustrations.  Thus, this paper or series of papers 
would concern exceptions to the privilege and to tort, criminal, and ethical 
duties of confidentiality, and the like. 
There are quite a few situations in which duties of confidentiality may 
not apply under these sources, and the situations may be somewhat different 
under each source.  All such situations should be put out on the table in this 
paper or series of papers.  A selection will be made later by the assembled 
group, regarding which situations are most significant for purposes of 
potentially requiring a warning to the interviewee.  The seminar would 
pursue these further, as detailed later herein.  Optionally, the teacher, at the 
outset of the seminar, could eliminate some situations he or she regards as 
less important or less manageable. 
The effort at this point in the seminar is to spread before the students for 
discussion a relatively complete list of things that might conceivably, in 
some situation or another, require a warning to the interviewee that 
confidentiality may subsequently be breached. 
The list might include, inter alia, the following subjects of permissible breach 
of confidentiality.  Each should be treated under (a) ethical or disciplinary law, 
(b) regulatory law, (c) privilege law, (d) tort law, and/or (e) criminal law.  How 
each subject plays out under each of these five sources, and whether they are 
different under each, should also be treated.28  The list is as follows: 
Situations of Possibly Justifiable Breaches of Confidentiality: 
(1) Waiver by corporation of privilege covering employee 
communications.29 
826 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); In re Sellers, 669 So. 2d 1204 (La. 1996); In re Detention of 
Williams, 22 P.3d 283 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).  Violation of an ethical rule of confidentiality 
does not itself necessarily mean malpractice has been committed. See Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct pmbl., para. 20. 
 27. For example, ethical rules covered would include rules like ABA Model Rules 1.6(b) 
and 1.13 (2003) and perhaps Rules 1.2(d), 3.3, 4.1(b), 8.1, and 8.3, as well as others.  Also 
covered should be the more limited exceptions to confidentiality in the analogous provisions 
of the ABA’s 2000 Model Rules, 1983 Model Rules, 1969 Model Code, and 1908 Canons of 
Ethics.  Some states still have something similar to these older versions.  The students should 
cover representative state rules and rulings as well. 
 28. I am including a list because I think both the teacher and the students may need some 
guidance.  It still leaves room for the student’s paper to develop more fully and support the 
items on this list and add to the list.  To facilitate this, I have limited my citations to only 
those needed to suggest my direction. 
 29. See Rothstein, supra note 3, at 173–77.  As an adjunct to this, the student should 
include some discussion concerning the ethics of representing both the corporation and the 
employee, and the danger that the interviewee may make assumptions in this regard. See 
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(a) Express waiver to help law enforcement or for public 
appearances. 
(i) In general. 
(ii) Government leniency policies and promises.30 
(b) Internal investigations considered “arm of law.”31 
(c) Waiver requirements imposed by independent auditors, 
audit committees, and stock exchanges.32 
(d) Waiver as to underlying materials by submitting reports 
to auditors or government agencies.33 
(e) Bankruptcy.34 
(2) “Watchdog” counsel.35 
(3) Fiduciary-beneficiary exception:  Garner v. Wolfinbarger 
doctrine.36 
(4) Preventing harm to others. 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13(g); Annotated Model Rules, supra note 25, at 219–
23, 228–30; Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:20. 
 30. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.  In addition to provisions for credit 
for such cooperation in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, several government agencies, 
including the SEC and the Department of Justice have cooperation policies in place. See 
Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake:  The Conceptual Fault Line in the 
Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1089 (2006); C. Evan Stewart, 
This Is a Fine Mess You’ve Gotten Me Into:  The Revolution in the Legal Profession, N.Y. 
Bus. L.J., Summer 2006, at 15.  The Department of Justice purports to have recently 
softened its stance on pushing for waiver of attorney-client and work-product protections, in 
what is known as the “McNulty Memorandum.” See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
U.S. Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty Revises Charging Guidelines for Prosecuting 
Corporate Fraud (Dec. 12, 2006), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/December/06_odag_828.html.  Many believe the change 
is only cosmetic. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Commentary:  
McNulty Memo Will Have Marginal Effect on Deferred and Nonprosecution Agreements, 
Corp. Couns., Mar. 27, 2007, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1174912597365. 
 31. See Rothstein, supra note 3, at 176 n.16. 
 32. See id. at 176 n.15. 
 33. See id. 
 34. A trustee in bankruptcy of a corporation, like other successors, has the power to 
waive privilege for the corporation, and frequently does. See generally Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985); Paul F. Rothstein, Federal Rules of 
Evidence 251 (3d ed. 2007).  Certain other persons in the nature of receivers have that power 
as well. See Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:22.  The trustee of a bankrupt individual 
may not have similar power. 
 35. See Rothstein, supra note 34, at 246–48.  The student should examine whether this 
applies in the ethical context as well. 
 36. See Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:38.  The student should examine whether 
similar principles apply in the ethical context as well. 
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(a) Sarbanes-Oxley regulations.37 
 37. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2007); see supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.  The 
regulations provide for two kinds of reporting of lawyer confidences: 
(1) Mandatory “Up-the-Ladder” (Inside the Client) Reporting.  Covered lawyers 
who become aware of credible evidence of certain “material” wrongdoing by 
their client company (or agent thereof) must report it to the chief legal officer 
of the client and (discretionarily) to the client’s chief executive officer.  The 
chief legal officer must, upon being so notified, institute an inquiry into 
whether or not the violation has, is, or will take place.  He or she must then 
advise the lawyer who reported, of what has been found and any action taken.  
If the lawyer/reporter reasonably believes that the report has not been 
promptly and appropriately responded to, the lawyer is required to report the 
matter to the audit committee of the board of directors or another committee 
composed solely of outside directors who are not “interested persons,” or the 
board itself if there is no committee.  If the client has a “legal compliance 
committee” to which the lawyer reported, the lawyer need not go any further 
and gauge the response. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b). 
(2) Permissive Outside-the-Ladder (Outside the Client) Reporting to the SEC.  A 
covered lawyer may disclose confidential client information to the SEC, if the 
lawyer reasonably believes it necessary to: 
(a) prevent “a material violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to 
the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors,” id. § 
205.3(d)(2)(i);  
(b) prevent the client from committing perjury or subornation or an act 
likely to defraud the SEC, id. § 205.3(d)(2)(ii); or 
(c) “rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that 
caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or 
property of the issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the 
attorney’s services were used,” id. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii). 
Ordinarily, a lawyer probably could only believe the outside-the-ladder reporting is 
“necessary” if the up-the-ladder reporting had not obtained satisfactory results.  The 
permission to report outside the client arguably goes beyond what Congress contemplated. 
See supra note 6.  It would also seem to violate traditional notions of lawyer confidentiality 
and privilege as still found in the legal and ethical prescriptions of a number of states, at least 
as to past wrongdoing.  These states have not adopted provisions like the 2002/2003 
amendments to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6 and 1.13 (which are 
consistent with the SEC regulations).  Do Congress and the SEC have constitutional power 
to override state prescriptions when it is the states that license lawyers?  For example, 
California’s privilege and ethics rules, like those in many other states, seem to forbid 
outside-the-ladder reporting except in certain narrow instances (e.g., to prevent death or 
serious bodily injury). See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e) (2007); Cal. Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 3-100, 3-600 (2004); Cal. R. Ct. 3.1362(c) (West 2007); Cal. Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 3-210 (Discussion Draft 2006).  The SEC regulations expressly purport to 
override state provisions to the contrary. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1, 205.6(a)–(c), 205.7.  But 
there is an open question as to their constitutionality in this regard.  For a variety of views on 
this question, see generally N.C. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 9 (2006); Corps. 
Comm. of the Bus. Law Section of the Calif. State Bar, Conflicting Currents:  The 
Obligation to Maintain Inviolate Client Confidences and the New SEC Attorney Conduct 
Rules, 32 Pepp. L. Rev. 89 (2004); and Cramton et al., supra note 12. See also Corps. 
Comm. of the Bus. Law Section & Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Ethics 
Alert:  The New SEC Attorney Conduct Rules v. California’s Duty of Confidentiality 
(2004), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/SEC-ethics-alert.pdf. 
The SEC has under consideration some even more extensive inroads on confidentiality. 
See Shawn Harpen, Eric Landau & Kathryn Lohmeyer, The SEC’s Proposed Noisy 
Withdrawal Rule:  Intended and Unintended Consequences, Orange County Law., June 
2007, at 42 (2007).  These authors suggest that if these go into effect, some sort of corporate 
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(b) Other provisions allowing disclosure to prevent serious 
property or financial loss.38 
(c) Provisions allowing disclosure to prevent death or 
serious bodily harm.39 
(d) Tarasoff-type and related tort liability for not disclosing 
potential harm.40 
(5) Lawyer charged with obstruction of justice or other offense for 
keeping communications confidential.41 
(6) Inadvertent waiver during massive document discovery.42 
(7) “Quick-peek” discovery agreements.43 
“Miranda warning” may become necessary.  “Corporate attorneys may need to advise 
officers and other agents of the corporation that the attorney may decide to disclose 
information and documentation provided to the attorney, in addition to the legal advice 
conveyed by the attorney.” Harpen, Landau & Lohmeyer, supra, at 48–49. 
 38. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3), 1.13 (2007); Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 67 (2000). 
Forty-one states permit (and four of them require) a lawyer to disclose confidential 
information to prevent a client’s criminal fraud. . . . Eighteen states permit a 
lawyer to disclose confidential information to rectify or mitigate a past client fraud 
in which the lawyer’s services were used. . . . Forty-four states permit (and three 
require) a lawyer to disclose confidential information relating to a client’s ongoing 
criminal or fraudulent act. 
Cramton et al., supra note 12, at 784 (citations omitted). 
 39. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(1); Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers § 66.  Students may also examine analogous state provisions and 
ethical opinions such as R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 98-12 (1998). See also Cal. 
Evid. Code § 956.5 (West 2007) (“There is no privilege . . . if the lawyer reasonably believes 
that disclosure . . . is necessary to prevent [the client from committing] a criminal act that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death of, or substantial bodily harm to an 
individual.”); People v. Dang, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Ct. App. 2001); Fox Searchlight 
Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (Ct. App. 2001); Purcell v. Dist. Att’y, 676 
N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997); State v. Hansen, 862 P.2d 117 (Wash. 1993).  Contra State v. 
Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976). 
 40. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976).  The SOX 
regulations expressly do not provide any private right of action for their violation, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 205.7, but there are SEC penalties and remedies, id. § 205.7(b). 
 41. The traditional cases where attorneys have been charged usually also involved some 
tampering or meddling with physical evidence brought to the attention of the attorney by the 
client. See In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967), aff’d per curiam, 381 F.2d 713 
(4th Cir. 1967); People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981); cf. People v. Belge, 372 
N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975), aff’d, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div. 1975).  But 
students should be able to find other cases as well. 
 42. Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (D. Md. 2005) 
(setting forth the various positions on inadvertent waiver of attorney-client privilege); see 
also Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:30; Paul F. Rothstein, Myrna S. Raeder & David 
Crump, Evidence in a Nutshell 207–08 (5th ed. 2007) [hereinafter Evidence in a Nutshell]; 
Paul F. Rothstein, Myrna S. Raeder & David Crump, Evidence:  Cases, Materials and 
Problems 894–95 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2007) [hereinafter Evidence:  Cases, Materials & 
Problems].  The cited pages in these books also refer to some relevant new and proposed 
evidence and procedure rules on the matter, including newly amended Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(5) and proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502. 
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(8) Business (nonlegal) purpose doctrine.44 
(9) No privilege for identity of client, fact of visits or consultation, 
ministerial matters, fees, broad subject matter of consultation, 
and other generalized information.45 
(10) Risk of interception of communications by fax, e-mail, or cell 
or cordless phones.46 
 43. See citations in supra note 42 that also deal with “quick-peek” agreements. 
 44. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977); 
Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:8 (explaining that, under privilege, the purpose of the 
consultation must be for professional legal services).  Ethics codes frequently have 
somewhat similar provisions.  The problem is exacerbated where an attorney wears “two 
hats,” i.e., has a business position with the client corporation as well as being its lawyer. See 
SEC v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675 (D.D.C. 1981).  English lawyers have 
had a particular problem with the “nonlawyer” purpose doctrine. See Three Rivers Dist. 
Council v. Bank of Eng., [2004] UKHL 48 (Eng.). 
 45. For a good statement of the varying positions under privilege, see United States v. 
Sindel, 53 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 1995), which deals with the Internal Revenue Service 
requirement to report the receipt and source of payments over $10,000 as applied to a 
lawyer’s fee from a client, but treats the general question posed here. See Rothstein, supra 
note 34, at 244–46; Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:11; see also Alan Mandel, 
Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege as a Protection of Client Identity:  Can Defense 
Attorneys Be the Prosecution’s Best Witnesses?, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 81 (1983).  
Regarding the relative absence of the general principle under ethics rules and rulings, see In 
re Goebel, 703 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind. 1998); Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 99-
35 (1999); Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct, Op. 97-1 (1997); Iowa Sup. 
Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 97-4 (1997); cf. United States v. Legal Servs., 249 
F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  On client’s whereabouts, see John R. Przypyszny, Public 
Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege:  Ramifications of Baltes v. Doe, 3 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 351 (1989); Shelly K. Hillyer, Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege, Ethical Rules 
of Confidentiality, and Other Arguments Bearing on Disclosure of a Fugitive Client’s 
Whereabouts, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 307 (1995). 
 46. See David Hricik, Confidentiality and Privilege in High-Tech Communications, 60 
Tex. B.J. 104 (1997); David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client 
Confidences by Internet E-mail, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 459 (1998); Karen Mika, Of Cell 
Phones and Electronic Mail:  Disclosure of Confidential Information Under Disciplinary 
Rule 4-101 and Model Rule 1.6, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 121 (1999); 
Jonathan Rose, Note, E-mail Security Risks:  Taking Hacks at the Attorney-Client Privilege, 
23 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 179 (1997).  See also the following cases on e-mails:  In 
re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2007); Curto v. Med. World Commc’n, No. 
03CV6327, 2006 WL 1318387 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (affirming the magistrate judge’s 
order that plaintiff-employee did not waive attorney-client privilege with respect to e-mail 
communications to her lawyer using the company’s e-mail system); Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 
228; In re Asousa P’ship, No. 01-12295DWS, 2005 WL 3299823 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 
2005); In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting 
that in determining whether an employee’s use of the company e-mail system to 
communicate with his personal attorney destroyed the attorney-client or work-product 
privilege, the court considered four factors:  “(1) does the corporation maintain a policy 
banning personal or other objectionable use, (2) does the company monitor the use of the 
employee’s computer or e-mail, (3) do third parties have a right of access to the computer or 
e-mails, and (4) did the corporation notify the employee, or was the employee aware, of the 
use and monitoring policies?”).  Relevant to the analysis was the fact that although the 
company published a policy notifying employees they should have no expectation of privacy 
in e-mails as the company would monitor them, this policy was rarely enforced.  On cell 
phones, see the following ethics opinions:  State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l 
  
2007] A PROPOSED SEMINAR ON CONFIDENTIALITY 1759 
 
(11) One-way protection.47 
(12) Opening-the-door and shield-sword principles.48 
(13) Crime-fraud privilege exception and related ethical 
prescriptions.49 
(a) Does it apply beyond crimes and frauds to wrongdoing 
generally?50 
(b) When does concealment of a privileged past wrong 
become an unprivileged continuing cover-up?51 
(c) Quantum of proof to trigger the exception.52 
(d) Quantum to trigger in camera inspection of privileged 
material.53 
(e) Risk that entire matter becomes tainted by illegality of 
part.54 
(14) Exception for disputes between client and lawyer or when 
client alleges malfeasance of lawyer.55 
Conduct, Op. 95-11 (1995); Del. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 2001-2 
(2001); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 90-44 (1991); Mass. Bar Ass’n 
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 94-5 (1994); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. 
on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Op. 1994-11 (1994); N.C. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 
215 (1995); N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 1991-92/6 (1992); Wash. State Bar Ass’n 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct Comm., Informal Op. 91-1 (n.d.). 
 47. See Rothstein, supra note 34, at 244; Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:13. 
 48. Rothstein, supra note 34, at 252. 
 49. See, e.g., Unif. R. Evid. 502(d)(1); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1(b), 3.3 
(2007). 
 50. For cases extending the crime-fraud exception beyond crimes and frauds, see 
Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the crime-fraud 
exception includes any intentional tort that may undermine the adversary system); Irving 
Trust Co. v. Gomez, 100 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that the crime-fraud 
exception embraces any unlawful conduct regardless of whether it constitutes fraud or any 
intentional tort—including reckless tortious behavior); Diamond v. Stratton, 95 F.R.D. 503 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress falls within the 
crime-fraud exception). 
 51. See, e.g., In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982); Sound Video 
Unlimited, Inc. v. Video Shack, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1482 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
 52. See, e.g., United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313 (6th Cir. 1997) (requiring a prima 
facie showing upon which a reasonable person would have a reasonable basis to suspect the 
perpetration of a crime or fraud). There are many other formulations. See cases cited on 
burden of proof in Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:36. 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989); In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the Zolin standard requires the 
court to speculate); see also cases cited on in camera inspection in Rothstein & Crump, 
supra note 13, § 2:36. 
 54. A particularly graphic example of this is Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1953). Cf. Collis, 128 F.3d 313. 
 55. The situations that may be embraced include allegations by the client of malpractice 
in tort cases, allegations by the client of ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases, 
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(15) Exception in some jurisdictions for lawyers defending selves 
against criminal, civil, or ethical allegations whether or not 
made by client.56 
(a) Upsurge of criminal and civil charges against 
lawyers.57 
(b) Variation:  Lawyer seeking advice on own ethical/legal 
obligations.58 
(16) Exception where needed by third-party criminal defendants for 
their defense.59 
(17) Wills exception.60 
charges by the client of ethical violations before disciplinary tribunals, efforts both formal 
and informal to collect or resist the lawyer’s fees, and others. See Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 1.6(b)(3) cmts. 10, 11 (2007).  The kinds of proceedings involving lawyers in 
which this might arise are suggested in Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§§ 5 (professional discipline), 6 (judicial remedies), 7 (judicial remedies available to a client 
or nonclient for lawyer wrongs), and 8 (lawyer criminal offenses) (2000).  For further 
instances, see Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 48 (professional 
negligence—elements and defenses generally), 49 (breach of fiduciary duty generally), 50 
(duty of care to a client), 52 (the standard of care), 53 (causation and damages), 54 
(defenses; prospective liability waiver; settlement with a client), 55 (civil remedies of a 
client other than for malpractice), 56 (liability to a client or nonclient under general law), and 
65 (using or disclosing information in a compensation dispute).  Ethics opinions relating to 
disclosure of client confidences in fee disputes are collected in the Annotated Model Rules, 
supra note 25, at 96–97.  On the corresponding exception to privilege, see Uniform Rule of 
Evidence 502(d)(3).  On use by an attorney of confidences of his ex-client to sue the ex-
client for wrongfully discharging the attorney, see Rothstein, supra note 34, at 253. 
 56. See generally Unif. R. Evid. 502(d)(4); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers §§ 30 (a lawyer’s liability to a third person for conduct on behalf of a client), 51 
(duty of care to certain nonclients), 56 (liability to a client or nonclient under general law), 
57 (nonclient claims—certain defenses and exceptions to liability), 58 (vicarious liability).  
There is some dispute (regarding both ethics and privilege) as to (1) whether disclosure is 
permitted when a third person (not the client) is making the allegations against the lawyer (or 
is otherwise in dispute with the lawyer) and, if so, (2) whether the matter nevertheless must 
somehow involve the lawyer’s representation of the client whose confidential information is 
being disclosed. Annotated Model Rules, supra note 25, at 96–98; Rothstein & Crump, 
supra note 13, § 2:37.  The text of the Restatement rule seems to have neither restriction on 
disclosure but requires that the allegation or dispute arises out of the lawyer’s representation 
of some client. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 64 (using or 
disclosing information in a lawyer’s self-defense).  “A lawyer may use or disclose 
confidential client information . . . to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary to defend the lawyer or the lawyer’s associate or agent against a charge or 
threatened charge by any person that [the lawyer, associate, or agent] acted wrongfully in the 
course of representing a client.” Id.  Notice it says “a client,” not “the client.” 
 57. See, e.g., Qualters, supra note 16; see also Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 
2:37. 
 58. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(4) & cmt. 9. 
 59. See Evidence:  Cases, Materials & Problems, supra note 42, at 876–80; see also  
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
 60. As to privilege, see Uniform Rule Evidence 502(d)(2); Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 
404–07; Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:18.  There may, however, not be such an 
exception under ethics rules unless the court orders disclosure. See, e.g., N.D. State Bar 
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(18) Exception for government attorneys in criminal cases in some 
circuits.61 
(19) Information obtained by lawyer from third parties not 
privileged (even if obtained as result of confidential client 
communication).62 
(20) Joint or common-interest clients.63 
(21) Implied authority to disclose.64 
(22) Disclosures otherwise required by law or a court.65 
(23) Disclosure incident to or implied by withdrawal.66 
(24) Disclosure to employees, partners, secretaries, assistors, and 
agents of lawyer, and intrafirm disclosures generally.67 
(25) Insurance and billing information.68 
The seminar may decide that there are other subjects that should be on 
the list as well. 
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 95-11 (1995).  Note that the Uniform Rule states that the 
exception applies in disputes over testate succession as well. 
 61. See Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:21. 
 62. The client may direct the lawyer to third parties.  Ethical duties would prevent 
disclosure if information obtained from the third party related to the representation of the 
client, but privilege usually would not, so if a court ordered disclosure, the ethical duty 
would be removed. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(6) (2007); see also 
Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:11.  On the proposition that it may be covered by the 
ethical duty of confidentiality, see, for example, Annotated Model Rules, supra note 25, at 
90–91. 
 63.  Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, §§ 2:17, 2:34; cf. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
R. 1.7 cmt. 30.  
 64. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(a) cmt. 5, 1.2(a); Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 23(2), 26, 27, 61, 62 (2000); ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ops. 01-421 (2001), 98-411 (1998); ABA Comm. 
on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Ops. 89-1530 (1989), 86-1518 (1986); Ark. 
Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics & Grievances Comm., Advisory Op. 96-01 (1996); Haw. Sup. Ct. 
Disciplinary Bd., Formal Ethics Op. 38 (1999); Kan. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics/Advisory 
Servs., Op. 01-01 (2001).  Included under this heading would be waiver of privilege by the 
attorney preparing or refreshing the memory of a lay or expert witness for deposition or trial, 
by use of privileged material on or off the stand. See Rothstein, supra note 34, at 253. 
 65. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(6) & cmt. 12; Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 63.  
 66. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16. 
 67. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 5 (explaining that “a lawyer is 
impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the 
representation. . . . Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm’s practice, disclose to 
each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that 
particular information be confined to specified lawyers”). 
 68. See, e.g., Annotated Model Rules, supra note 25, at 89–90. 
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C.  Third Seminar Background Report:  Extent of Disclosure Under the 
Various Limits on Confidentiality 
The seminar may ultimately conclude that in certain situations not only 
should an interviewee be warned that there may be later disclosure, but also 
be warned of the extent of such possible disclosure69—the possibility, for 
example, that if the corporation waives its privilege to give information to 
the SEC, it may have waived as to all other agencies, prosecutors, and 
private parties as well, and may have waived not only as to the precise piece 
of information handed over, but as to everything related to the same subject 
matter.70  Application of the crime-fraud exception may work a similar 
expansive loss of privilege.71  Thus, the seminar should be informed of the 
doctrines concerning selective72 and subject-matter73 abrogation of 
confidentiality and other doctrines that may impact the extent of disclosure 
under the various limits on or exceptions to confidentiality.  This particular 
seminar report should focus on these issues. 
D.  Fourth Seminar Background Report:  Changes in Corporate Structure 
and Climate that May Increase the Chances of Nonconfidentiality 
This paper should be concerned with such issues as the burgeoning use of 
independent directors and audit committees, and other societal and 
corporate culture factors that may bear on the likelihood of corporate 
waiver.74
At the end of this phase, the seminar as a group should reach a decision 
as to which are the most important limits on confidentiality that should 
engender advance warning, eliminating from further seminar consideration 
other limits.  This group meeting, then, will have narrowed the limits that 
will be further considered by the seminar, down to a small handful, the 
exact number depending upon practical considerations such as how 
important and frequent the limit is likely to be, how many students are in 
the seminar, and the demands of an equitable workload.  A decision should 
be made at this point about whether warnings should include references to 
the extent of loss of confidentiality treated in the third seminar background 
report above.75
 69. See, e.g., Banner v. City of Flint, 136 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Mich. 2000); ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-421 (2001) (noting that before 
consenting to disclosure, client must be informed of all the effects of disclosure). 
 70. The exposure to criminal and regulatory liability and extensive private lawsuits 
could be quite a bit more significant than might be realized. 
 71. Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:36. 
 72. Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, § 2:31. 
 73. Rothstein & Crump, supra note 13, §§ 2:29, 2:35. 
 74. Some of these are suggested in Rothstein, supra note 3, at 173–79. See also supra 
notes 13, 14 and accompanying text. 
 75. See supra Part IV.C. 
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V.  SEMINAR PHASE TWO:  SPECIFIC CREATIVE PAPERS ON THE NARROWED 
GROUP OF CONFIDENTIALITY LIMITS, TENTATIVELY RECOMMENDING 
SPECIFIC WARNINGS IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS 
This phase will embrace approximately the fifth and sixth weeks of the 
seminar.76  The papers here would each be devoted to one limit (in the 
narrowed group of limits) and each paper would be written, preferably, by 
one student.  Each paper should be a creative attempt to envision a few of 
the most important interview situations where a warning should be 
triggered, and to fashion the specific warning.  The paper should make 
liberal use of hypothetical fact patterns, recommend specifically when a 
lawyer should be alerted to the need for a warning, cite legal and ethical 
precedent explaining why, and then fashion the specific warning (including 
how to communicate to the interviewee what kind of situations may 
engender subsequent disclosure and the potential breadth thereof).  I call 
these recommendations tentative, even though they are very specific, 
because later sessions of the seminar (in particular the mock interviews and 
the examination of existing general ethical prescriptions about informing 
clients) may change perceptions of what is needed. 
VI.  SEMINAR PHASE THREE:  MOCK INTERVIEWS 
This phase, lasting about three weeks, will involve role-playing.  I want 
to leave considerable flexibility here for the teacher to fashion mock 
interviews that suit the teacher’s own preferences and that respond to what 
may have surfaced thus far in the particular seminar sessions, particularly in 
the reports in the preceding (the second) seminar phase.  It may be that 
specific role-playing problems could be fashioned based directly on some 
of the hypothetical situations given in the papers in that phase.  If so, the 
students who composed those hypothetical situations could be used as 
interviewers or interviewees in the corresponding problem. 
I would have from one to three role-playing problems.  Each problem 
should have a student assigned as a lawyer, interviewing another student (or 
the teacher) playing the role of interviewee.  Each mock interview should 
be played out before the assembled group.  Time for the students to conduct 
advance preparation for the interviews should be provided.  Perhaps the 
first hour of the two-hour session could be allowed for advance preparation 
by students assigned to each problem.  The preparation would be done in 
secret from the rest of the group. 
At least one of the problems should have some ambiguity as to whether 
the interviewee is proposing something wrongful or simply inquiring about 
whether and how a business goal can be accomplished, perhaps in a 
complex regulatory environment.  To add a wrinkle, the wrongdoing could 
be something other than a crime or fraud—for example a regulatory 
infraction, breach of contract, or nonfraudulent tort.  It would also be 
 76. All the week allocations can be varied. 
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desirable to have a problem in which there is ambiguity about whether the 
wrongdoing the interviewee reveals would be classified as purely past, or 
whether there might be continuing effects.  For example, holding 
confidential past corporate wrongdoing risks the possibility that investors 
will purchase company stock at inflated prices which could plummet when 
the truth gets out.  This might be considered a future fraud. 
At least one of the problems should be in the corporate setting.  The 
corporation’s lawyer should interview an employee who may risk some 
personal liability.  The facts should be such that there is a possibility the 
corporation may be tempted later to waive confidentiality in order to 
cooperate with a regulatory or law enforcement agency.  A side issue in this 
problem might involve whether the lawyer does (and whether the lawyer 
could) represent both the corporation and the employee and what needs to 
be said to whom in order to do so or to prevent unwarranted expectations of 
personal representation.77
As the roles are played out, the problems should give rise to a growing 
feeling that there is a tension here:  the more the interviewees are warned so 
they can make an intelligent decision to talk or not, the less communicative 
and frank they may become.  As this phase of the seminar unfolds, there 
should be a discussion of this trade-off, and whether it should influence the 
shape and strength of the ethical duty to warn. 
If the papers in the previous phase of the seminar do not suggest 
sufficient role-playing problems to the teacher, here are a few provisional 
suggestions of mine for problems that could be used for the role-playing: 
(1) A problem based on the actual interviews in Upjohn itself, but 
updated to modern times.  The facts and background of the 
interviews in that case, as well as differences in corporate 
climate then, are detailed in The Story of Upjohn v. United 
States: One Man’s Journey to Extend Lawyer-Client 
Confidentiality, and the Social Forces that Affected it.78 
(2) A problem based on the Upjohn interviews but with factual 
changes in addition to updating.  The facts could be changed to 
make it less clear that the purpose of Upjohn’s self-
investigation was a professional legal purpose rather than a 
business purpose.  Perhaps it was for customer relations or 
publicity.  The lawyer in Upjohn wore a “business hat” as well 
as a lawyer’s hat.  This was downplayed in the Upjohn decision 
itself.  But it could be highlighted and beefed up in the 
modified problem.  This would sensitize the students to some 
risks they may face in a relatively common situation in law 
practice.  Lawyers frequently are tempted to take on a business 
position in addition to their legal duties with their client 
corporations.  For example they may become a member of the 
corporate client’s board or become a business officer or 
 77. See supra note 29. 
 78. See supra note 3. 
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member of management for the client.  There could be a 
discussion here of some of the relative risks and benefits of 
doing so. 
The facts could be further changed so that the interviewee is the 
president of the company who, along with the company, might 
also be represented by the lawyer, and who personally may 
have known of the wrongdoing.79
These modified Upjohn problems would involve a number of 
subjects raised in the seminar:  the notion that the corporation 
may waive the privilege in today’s corporate environment, the 
ethics of dual representation, the crime-fraud exception, the 
possibility of the lawyer being charged with a crime and having 
to defend himself down the road, continuing effects of 
wrongdoing, possible cover-ups, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
regulations, the business purpose doctrine, the possibility that a 
corporate internal investigation may be viewed as an arm of the 
law so that misstatements in the interviews may be considered 
obstruction of justice, and problems presented by the lawyer 
who wears two hats for his client. 
(3) A problem based on the toxic waste hypothetical in American 
Bar Association Model Rule 1.6, comment 6.  An ambiguity 
could be built-in concerning whether the amount of pollutant 
discharged actually does exceed the legal limit.  There could be 
some uncertainty about how the pollution is to be measured 
under the law.80  This problem could raise, among other things, 
issues concerning the continuing effect of a cover-up. 
VII.  SEMINAR PHASE FOUR:  FINAL UNIFIED REPORT 
This phase comprises the final weeks of the seminar.  The ultimate 
product of this phase would be the “end product” described earlier.  The 
work should proceed in the following stages: 
(1) Are Existing Warning Requirements Sufficient?  A student 
should be assigned to brief the seminar orally and in writing as 
to existing law which might require a lawyer to warn 
interviewees in advance about the limits of confidentiality at 
least in certain situations.81  After hearing this, the students 
 79. This problem could raise, inter alia, the question of whether the warning for a 
sophisticated client could be less than for a nonsophisticated one. See Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 1.0 cmt. 6 (2007). 
 80. See, e.g., Envtl. Defense v. Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2007). 
 81. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.0(e) & cmt. 6, 1.4(a), 1.4(b) cmts. 5, 7, 
1.7 cmt 30, 1.8(b).  California, like a number of states, requires lawyers, to the extent 
reasonable under the circumstances, to “inform the client, at an appropriate time, of the 
[lawyer’s] ability or decision to reveal information” to prevent a criminal act likely to result 
in death or substantial bodily harm. Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3-100(C)(2) (2004).  If 
this kind of warning is required before disclosure to prevent death or bodily harm, a fortiori 
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would collectively decide on the extent to which the new 
warnings rule(s) is needed. 
(2) Collaborative Meeting:  Consensus.  This is discussed earlier, 
in Part II.A.  The seminar would reach a consensus, and 
proposals for the draft rule(s) and commentary would be agreed 
upon, in general outline. 
(3) Final Draft Ethics Code Provision on Duty to Warn (with 
Commentary of Examples).  This is discussed earlier, in Part 
II.A.  A final draft of the rule(s) and commentary would be 
produced. 
(4) Costs of Such Warning Provisions:  Any Final Changes to the 
Draft in Light Thereof.  This is the final meeting, with the final 
draft of the rule(s) and commentary before the students.  It 
would be a whole-group oral discussion session that does not 
necessarily need to be preceded by a report.  Here the 
assembled group would discuss the trade-off between warning 
the interviewee and getting information from him or her.  
Inevitably, there is a tension between the two.  The discussion 
should, inter alia, query whether the attorney-client privilege 
can accomplish its purpose if lawyers adopt the ethical 
provision(s) drafted by the students.82  If the seminar has gone 
such a warning should be required before exposing a confidence to prevent fraud or property 
or financial injury. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(d) cmt. 13; Utah State Bar 
Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 97-06 (1997) (finding that a lawyer receiving payment 
of a fee by credit card from a client desiring to keep his identity confidential should warn the 
client that the credit card company will have that information).  There is some law 
suggesting that clients should be warned by their lawyer that cell phone conversations may 
be intercepted. See supra note 46.  This has heightened resonance today, at least in certain 
kinds of cases, because of increased government electronic surveillance in connection with 
terrorism. See Learning to Live with Big Brother, Economist, Sept. 29, 2007, at 62 (“These 
days, data about people’s whereabouts, purchases, behaviour and personal lives are gathered, 
stored and shared on a scale that no dictator of the old school ever thought possible.”). 
The student should also try to find any tort decisions there may be in the legal malpractice 
area holding a lawyer liable for failure to warn of potential abrogation by the lawyer of client 
confidentiality. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  For purposes of reasoning by 
analogy, the student should bring forward medical, psychiatric, and legal malpractice 
decisions involving failure to warn a patient or client of risks of treatment or risks incident to 
following certain legal advice.  Cases of failure to disclose to the patient or client conflicts of 
interest would also be relevant. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974); 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7(b) & cmts. 18, 19.  
 82. In the discussion at this point, the teacher may wish to recall the admonition repeated 
by the Supreme Court in Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Swidler & Berlin v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998); and Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) to the effect 
that, if the point is to encourage communications, a qualified privilege is no better than no 
privilege.  In addition, the question could be raised with the students here, as to whether 
there was always an inherent flaw in the reasoning of Upjohn.  Would employees be 
encouraged by the privilege to communicate forthrightly with corporate counsel about self-
damaging topics, when they know that the privilege is the corporation’s, not theirs, to raise 
or waive as the corporation sees fit?  Was Upjohn suggesting this be hidden from the 
employees? 
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according to plan, the students will have plenty to say on this 
subject at this point, having been exposed to the tension and its 
ingredients all along. 
A teacher could take up this last subject earlier.  Arguably, it bears on the 
shape of the ethical prescriptions the seminar will have fashioned by this 
point, and should have been considered before the final drafting.  But I 
prefer to take it up here.  I believe the considerations of ethics that would 
require one to warn (considerations centering on the desirability of 
informed choice of the interviewee) are quite distinct from the need for 
information.  It does not seem to me that, if fairness to the interviewee 
requires a warning, the need for information should prevent the warning.  
Nevertheless, this belief of mine is open to question, and should be 
discussed before the assembled group.  If the students then feel the ethical 
provision(s) they have drafted should be changed after this discussion, then 
their draft should be revisited at this point and changed.  I think such a 
course of action would be educational.  It would be the final act of the 
seminar. 
 
 
